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a b s t r a c t
In the Western United States, widespread growth of wind and solar resources is putting pressure on state
policy makers, electricity system operators, and utilities to integrate renewable resources into the grid,
while maintaining reliability, affordability, and improving efﬁciency. These resources are creating new
challenges because their variability can contribute to transmission constraints and system imbalances.
This paper examines a recent initiative to make energy imbalance market services available throughout
the Western Interconnection and provides insight into evolving electricity system governance. Drawing
on boundary organization and interorganizational collaboration literature, this research explores the
processes and practices used to create a new interorganizational collaboration. The research supports
theoretical claims that facilitating policy innovation requires discursive formation of a collective identity.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction
In many countries the widespread growth of wind and solar
electric generation is changing how electricity systems are planned
and operated. Policymakers, planners, and grid operators seek to
integrate variable renewable resources while maintaining system
reliability and affordability. These actors need to innovate organizationally to advance both regional integration and decarbonization,
which can be difﬁcult [1,2]. At base, these challenges are ones of
governance, and approaches to meeting them have varied across
countries and regions in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and
North Africa [3–10]. This study of an innovative approach in the
Western United States provides insight into these regional governance challenges.
In the United States more than 64 GW of wind and 10 GW of solar
capacity accounted for 7% of net summer capacity [11]. The variability of these renewable resources can contribute to transmission
constraints and system imbalances. In response to this variability,
in the short term, grid operators can ramp up ﬂexible resources, if
available, or curtail wind generator production to reduce output. In

the longer term, they can expand the system’s geographic footprint,
develop more ﬂexible resources, or build additional transmission
capacity. As renewable resources have become a larger part of the
system, curtailments of wind and solar have increased. For example, in recent years some regions have curtailed from 1 to 4% of wind
generation while Texas curtailed as much as 17% of wind generation [12]. Resource curtailment affects the economics of wind and
solar development and can stymie progress toward policy goals.
This situation is not unique to the United States, and worldwide many different organizations are evolving new and innovative
approaches to better integrate renewable energy into electricity
systems [13]. However, in the United States, multiple overlapping
jurisdictions, legacy operations, and fractured electricity system
governance have made wind and solar integration especially challenging. Historically, the U.S. electricity system has been “highly
balkanized relative to most other countries” [14]. While state or
regional electricity markets now coordinate 70% of wholesale electricity trades [15], across the western states, energy federalism
continues to shape decentralized decision-making and coordination has often been fractious. For example, while most of California
participates in a wholesale energy market operated by the Cal-

∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: stephanielenhart@u.boisestate.edu
(S. Lenhart), nelsonma@up.edu (N. Nelson-Marsh), ewilson@umn.edu (E.J. Wilson),
davidsolan@boisestate.edu (D. Solan).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.05.015
2214-6296/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
0/).

S. Lenhart et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 19 (2016) 94–107

ifornia Independent System Operator (CAISO),1 the rest of the
Western Interconnection2 has opposed joining federally authorized regional transmission organizations (RTOs) like CAISO and
is managed through 37 other balancing authorities.2 The balancing
authorities are traditionally regulated and lack dynamic mechanisms to respond to energy imbalances or congestion. Within this
institutionally and jurisdictionally complex system, policies and
market designs determine the mix of generating resources, location of transmission assets, whether conventional or renewable
resources are curtailed, and the extent to which alternative tools
for maintaining system balance are available.
The expansion of renewable resources in the Western United
States has, in turn, increased pressure on utilities and energy system
planners to improve renewable resource integration while maintaining reliability, affordability, and improving system efﬁciencies.
State renewable energy policy goals, coupled with decreasing
costs of renewable technologies, have supported the installation
of approximately 75 GW of wind and solar across the West [16].
It has also led some industry leaders and policy makers in the
West to explore new approaches for regional electricity system
governance. In the Western Interconnection, expansion of regional
electricity markets would increase efﬁciency, reduce current and
anticipated curtailments, and facilitate renewable resource integration through automated economic dispatch and access to larger
geographic regions [17–24]. However, regionalization will alter the
distribution of beneﬁts and burdens among stakeholders and the
political and institutional challenges require more coordination,
policy innovation, and new institutional paradigms of electricity
system governance.
The recent CAISO initiative to make energy imbalance market (EIM) services available to balancing authorities throughout
the Western Interconnection is changing electricity system governance in critical ways. Typically Western balancing authorities have
relied on bilateral electricity contracts instead of real-time energy
markets. The EIM will extend the real-time energy market outside of California while allowing Western-balancing authorities to
maintain a level of autonomy from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) jurisdiction and the CAISO market. The EIM provides
participating balancing authorities and CAISO with greater efﬁciency and ﬂexibility through real-time automated and economic
dispatch, improved communications, increased system visibility,
access to additional ﬂexible reserves, and sharing of resources.
Expansion of the EIM to PaciﬁCorp, the ﬁrst balancing authority to
participate, started live operation on November 1, 2014. NV Energy
began participating in December 2015 and Puget Sound Electric
and Arizona Public Service Company signed agreements to join
in 2016 (Fig. 1).3 However, important questions of long-term EIM
governance remain.
The EIM is being implemented through a newly emerging
interorganizational collaboration among CAISO, incumbent CAISO
stakeholders, new EIM participants, and other entities in the
Western Interconnection. An interorganizational collaboration is
a distinct organizational form in which members organize around
social problems or opportunities for innovation to leverage difference in knowledge, skills, or resources and to accomplish objectives
that could not be realized alone [25–27]. The emerging EIM
governance structure is a particular type of interorganizational collaboration, referred to as a boundary organization, in which policy

1
List of Acronyms: CAISO—California Independent System Operator; EIM—Energy
Imbalance Market; FERC—Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; PUC—Public Utility Commission; RTO—Regional Transmission Organization.
2
For deﬁnition see Table 1.
3
In November 2015 and in April 2016, Portland General Electric and Idaho Power,
respectively, announced their intent to join CAISO’s Energy Imbalance Market.
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and technical-scientiﬁc domains co-mingle [28,29], and the multiple tensions among diverse stakeholders are negotiated through a
dynamic process of continuous negotiation [28].
A fundamental issue for boundary organizations that rely on
voluntary participation is how to achieve collective action. CAISO
is extending its market infrastructure, but participation in the
EIM is voluntary. CAISO must engage with and be responsive
to stakeholders and delegation of CAISO authority is a central
implementation question. The nature of the EIM depends on the
interaction among incumbent and new stakeholders and their
willingness to participate in collective action. Interorganizational
collaboration literature suggests that collective identity can motivate collective action because it provides a rationale for cooperation
and creates the legitimacy needed to enable action [25]. Collective
identity is particularly important for collective action in voluntary collaborations where hierarchical and economic authority is
limited [25,26].
Traditional research on boundary organizations and collective
identity often conceptualizes interactions as seeking lasting stability among stakeholder demands [27–30] and identity as forming
around central, enduring, and distinctive attributes [31]. However,
given the pressing need for energy governance arrangements to be
dynamic, rather than static [32], the contingency of technological
development [33], and our interest in the process of governance
transition in the Western Interconnection, we draw on a growing
literature that focuses on the tension and ﬂuidity in both collective identity and boundary organizing [25,26,34–36]. This literature
is grounded in a discursive perspective, which focuses on how
collective identity is produced and reproduced through conversations, recognizes the contextual and temporal nature of boundary
organizing, shifts attention from assessing beliefs, and allows the
researcher to focus on how change occurs in practice. Furthermore, our approach and ﬁndings directly address some of the “most
promising avenues” as identiﬁed by Sovacool: communication and
persuasion, geography and scale, and institutions and energy governance. In particular, by examining a newly emerging governance
structure this study contributes to answering, How “have the central principles of governing energy shifted?” [37].
The purpose of this study is to conceptualize the context of
evolving electricity system governance in the Western United
States using a model of discourse and collaboration as a theoretical framework for explanation. We develop a longitudinal case
study of the formation of the EIM Transitional Committee. This
committee is an initial and temporary governance structure for the
EIM. Using document analysis, interviews and ﬁeld observations
we explain the boundaries that contributed to the previous lack of
organized markets in the Western Interconnection and we trace the
emergence of the EIM Transitional Committee and a new collective
identity.
This study extends the literature on collective identity and
interorganizational collaboration to the context of boundary organizations by demonstrating how discursive practices and strategies
can constitute the collective identity of an emerging boundary organization. This study demonstrates how discursive practices that
maintain a space for both agreement and dissent contribute to formation of a dynamic collective identity. Furthermore, this study
demonstrates how the discursive strategy of abstraction can be
used to normalize dissensus and thereby, allow a collective identity
to form by orienting stakeholders to diverse understandings of an
issue and preserving participation of multiple voices. Finally, this
study explains the tensions in the Western Interconnection that
prevented previous efforts to introduce organized markets from
succeeding, how the growth of renewable resources has put pressure on legacy governance institutions, and the strategies that have
contributed to change.
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Fig. 1. Energy imbalance market participating balancing authorities.
Source: CAISO, 2015; http://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/CleanGrid/EIMOverview.aspx.

The next section provides background on electricity governance,
the role of CAISO, and the basic concept for the EIM. Section 3
reviews the boundary organization and interorganizational collaboration literature that provide the analytical framework for our
analysis. Section 4 describes our case study methods and data. Section 5 presents the details of our case and ﬁndings. Finally, Section
6 provides a discussion and conclusions.
2. Background
The integration of renewable resources is a challenge to grid
operators throughout the world [3–8], with no one-size-ﬁts-all
solution [4]. Integration requires grid operators to change how

resources are dispatched and balanced. This is more efﬁcient across
larger geographic regions and regions with non-correlated variable resources [17–24]. In the Western United States renewable
resource integration has proven especially challenging because the
Western Interconnection is connected through sub-regional balancing authorities, planning organizations, and bilateral contracts,
but it lacks the type of regional electricity system governance for
the transmission grid that is provided in other parts of the United
States by RTOs (Table 1).
In 1996 FERC authorized independent system operators (ISOs)
and later, regional transmission organizations to facilitate market
competition while maintaining grid reliability and streamlining

S. Lenhart et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 19 (2016) 94–107
Table 1
Western Interconnection Electricity Regulatory and Planning Organizations.

Note: Shaded rows have some level of CAISO oversight authority.

97

98

S. Lenhart et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 19 (2016) 94–107

system planning.4 RTOs are voluntary organizations that plan
for the electricity system, ensure bulk power system reliability,
operate wholesale energy markets, and centrally and dynamically dispatch generation. Decisions made by RTOs shape billions
of dollars in investments and market revenues and shape the
future of the energy system in critical ways. To participate in an
RTO, transmission owners transfer operational control of transmission facilities to the RTO who is then responsible for providing
non-discriminatory access to transmission. In the United States,
approximately 70% of bulk power electricity trades are managed
by RTOs [15].
CAISO was authorized in 1996 to facilitate restructuring of transmission, generation, wholesale, and retail services in California.5
CAISO now operates the transmission grid for about 80% of California electric load (about 35% of the Western Interconnection
electric load) and administers a wholesale energy market that
provides day-ahead, hour-ahead, and real-time imbalance market
services [38]. Unlike other RTOs, the CAISO Board of Governors is
not elected by members, but is appointed by the Governor of California. Another difference from other RTOs is that CAISO does not
have a formal committee structure based on sector representation.
For example, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator has
an Advisory Committee that includes elected representative from
ten sectors deﬁned by industry function (e.g., transmission owners) or interest (e.g., public consumers or environmental groups).
In contrast, CAISO uses ad hoc stakeholder engagement processes
to address priority issues in a relatively ﬂat structure, with stakeholder meetings open to all interested parties, oral and written
comments, and no voting.
CAISO is the only FERC-authorized RTO in the U.S. portion of
the Western Interconnection. Outside of CAISO, Western balancing authorities respond to supply and demand imbalances in real
time, but there are no market mechanisms to coordinate or optimize this response across balancing authorities. Energy transfers
between balancing authorities are ‘static’ and primarily managed
through standard one-hour schedules with transfers held constant
over the time period [39].6 Compared to the 15-min scheduling
and 5-min dispatch intervals in CAISO, other Western balancing
authorities are less operationally ﬂexible. While this is less efﬁcient
than market mechanisms, it did not create an operational problem
when the system relied on conventional dispatchable resources,
like coal, nuclear, natural gas or hydro, which are predictable and
controllable. However, variable wind and solar resources demand
increased operational ﬂexibility.
Fig. 2 illustrates the differences between separate balancing
authorities, an EIM, and CAISO and the arrows show access to different types of markets. Separate balancing authorities must each
manage energy imbalances independently; whereas, the EIM is a
mechanism that uses CAISO’s market services to manage real-time
energy imbalances across a region. EIM-participating balancing
authorities do not have access to the CAISO day-ahead or ancillary
services markets. Participation in the EIM is voluntary and there
is no exit fee. Implementation costs are negotiated between CAISO
and each EIM entity. EIM balancing authorities retain functional
and planning control over their transmission systems and retain
responsibility for compliance, reserve, and capacity requirements.

4

For the purposes of this paper we will use RTOs to denote both RTOs and ISOs.
Retail restructuring in California has been limited following the 2001 energy
crisis. Approximately 0.08 of total retail sales in California are from entities with an
ownership classiﬁcation of ‘retail power marketer’ [14].
6
Although 15-min scheduling has been established in many Western Interconnection balancing authorities in accordance with FERC Order 764, the region has not
developed a robust sub-hourly energy market [78].
5

Signiﬁcant technical work has been completed and continues
on the EIM market mechanisms and a Transitional Committee is
deliberating questions of governance. As of May 2015, four balancing authorities had reached agreements with CAISO to participate
in the EIM: PaciﬁCorp, NV Energy, Puget Sound Electric, and Arizona Public Service (Table 2). The EIM is anticipated to reach eight
states by the end of 2016: Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington,
Nevada, Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming.
3. A theoretical model of boundary organizational
collaboration
Increasingly, organizations in various sectors are developing
interorganizational collaborations to share scarce resources, reach
larger audiences, enter new markets, and foster innovation. The
EIM is being implemented through a newly emerging collaboration
among CAISO, incumbent CAISO stakeholders, new EIM participants, and other entities in the Western Interconnection. This
collaboration requires ongoing collective action to implement technical market mechanisms, establish a governance structure, and
negotiate the dynamic operation of an organized electricity market. To extend understandings of the complexity and potentials for
success in voluntary collaborations among diverse and competing
interests, we draw on boundary organization and interorganizational literature.
3.1. What is a boundary organization?
Traditionally boundary organizations were understood as
spaces to negotiate the boundary between policy decision making
and scientiﬁc or technical discretion [27], but today this concept
has grown to include a broader range of institutions and boundaries including politics, economics, culture, and science [49]. We
add electricity to this mix. A boundary organization is a particular type of interorganizational collaboration that goes beyond
bridging organizational boundaries to engaging in the ongoing
work of negotiating a contingent boundary [34]. Boundary organizations serve diverse organizations by allowing them to pursue
collaboration while maintaining legitimacy [27,30]. Electricity governance arrangements, like CAISO and the newly emerging EIM
governance structure, are natural boundary organizations. First,
RTOs act as boundary organizations because they are inter-sector
spaces of collaboration where at least two stakeholder organizations meet periodically face-to-face for planning, recommendation
development, decision-making, and taking action on decisions
made [30]. To promote efﬁcient and reliable markets, these organizations operate on a regional scale. This scale crosses traditional
jurisdictional and organizational boundaries and brings together
transmission owners, investor-owned utilities, publicly-owned
utilities, generators and marketers, alternative energy providers,
state regulators and policy makers, environmental organizations,
consumer ratepayer advocates, and industry associations.
Second, boundary organizations exist to develop policies and
practices that beneﬁt the variety of stakeholders involved [50]. This
too, is a characteristic of RTOs and the EIM governance structure.
By bringing together stakeholders that would otherwise occupy
distinct organizational spaces, boundary organizations purposefully introduce a variety of perspectives and rationalities for best
practices [27,28]. As Crona and Parker [50] state, boundary organizations “broker or mediate interactions across a border of diverse
purposes, incongruent values, and potential mutual incomprehension.” In other words, as boundary organizations, these regional
electricity governance structures act as ﬂattened organizational
spaces that facilitate collaboration across traditional boundaries by
bringing together multiple perspectives to innovate new ways of
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Fig. 2. The CAISO EIM is available to balancing authorities in the western interconnection. Adapted from Ref. [40].

knowing a problem and creating better solutions than any of the
institutions would have reached by acting alone [30].
While much of the boundary organization literature draws
attention to the aspects of collaboration that involve creating
mutual or shared understanding or a consensus (e.g., an agreement
as to how policy implementation will occur) [30], the interorganizational collaboration literature suggests the need to think
of collaboration as involving both consensus and dissensus communication [26,51–53]. Consensus meaning shared experiences
and dissensus meaning exploring of diverse perspectives. Both are
inherent and necessary in interorganizational collaboration and
for the implementation of policy by boundary organizations. We
demonstrate the dynamic nature of boundary work by drawing on
interorganizational collaboration theory to examine what collaboration looks like in practice.
3.2. Interorganizational collaboration and boundary organizing
The boundary organization literature highlights the EIM governance structure as a particular type of cooperative organizational

arrangement. The interorganizational collaboration literature
expands our understanding of how collaboration occurs. As Gray
(1989) notes, collaboration “is a process through which parties who
see different aspects of the problem can constructively explore
their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their
own limited vision of what is possible” [54]. The interorganizational collaboration literature adds four features. First, stakeholders
need to be interdependent or require each other for implementation. Second, stakeholders must own decisions collectively or have
an invested interest in the decisions. Third, members must share
responsibility for the future direction of the interorganizational or
boundary organization domain. Fourth, the interorganizational collaboration process is dynamic and emergent and cannot be codiﬁed.
To understand how these features operate in practice, we draw
on Hardy, Lawrence and Grant’s model of collective identity and
interorganizational collaboration [25]. Hardy et al. explain key
communicative or discursive forms that structure a collaborative
boundary organization environment and help identify the elements
and processes that lead to formation of collective identity and
successful collaboration. The beneﬁt of this theoretical model is
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Table 2
Comparison of CAISO and Participating EIM Balancing Authorities.
CAISO

Arizona Public Service

NV Energy

PaciﬁCorp

Puget Sound Energy

501(c)(3) nonproﬁt
authorized by FERC
Tariff and California
State Statute
States Served California and Nevada

Pinnacle West Capital
Corporation Utility

Berkshire Hathaway
Investor Owned Utility

Berkshire Hathaway
Investor Owned Utility

Puget Energy Investor
Owned Utility

Arizona

Nevada

Washington

1.2 million
9,187 MW
1%
4%
0%
<1%
13%
21%
61%
<1%%

1.34 million
6,124 MW
2%
1%
4%
6%
1%
25%
60%
0%

California, Idaho,
Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and
Wyoming
1.8 million
10,595 MW
8%
<1%
5%
<1%
0%
63%
14%
9%

Structure

Customers
Capacity
Sourcesa

Approx. 30 million
65,226 MW
wind
solar
hydro
geothermal
nuclear
coal
natural gas
other

9%
7%
15%
2%
5%
<1%
61%
3%

1.0 million
6,522 MW
7%
0%
41%
0%
2%
24%
25%
1%

Sources: [41–48].
a
CAISO net capacity as of 01/2014 does not include 17,4286 MW maximum import capacity for the ISO; APS data is estimated 2014 MW contribution at peak; NV Energy
data is electricity delivered September 2013–September 2014 aggregated from data for Sierra Paciﬁc and Nevada Power; PaciﬁCorp data is electricity delivered in 2013;
Puget Sound Energy is electricity delivered in 2013.

that it provides a practical focus. Hardy et al. illustrate how participants leverage differences, produce and innovate synergistic
solutions, and balance divergent stakeholder concerns by basing
their model on communication-in-action, also known as a discursive approach to collaboration. A discursive approach focuses
on everyday communication including language use, to understand how conversations emerge and how these conversations are
negotiated by participants in ways that increase or decrease participation [52,55]. A discursive approach also emphasizes the dynamic
nature of collaboration which is an iterative, social accomplishment
that emerges over time [25]. Thus, the focus is not on what stakeholders think, but on how they communicate because what people
say and do in conversation generates collective outcomes. Finally, a
discursive approach enables researchers to focus on various levels
of interaction, for example within an organization or at a broader
societal level, and explore interrelationships among these levels.
This enables researchers to understand how different kinds of relationships impact the formation of collective identity, collaboration,
and policy innovation over time. Therefore, our research examines
both the context of the prevailing regional discourse about electricity governance in the West and the discursive strategies used
to facilitate stakeholder discussions of EIM governance within the
EIM Transitional Committee deliberations.
The premise of effective collaboration for Hardy et al. [25]
centers around the idea “that discursive practices produce collective identities, which lead to various forms of collective action,
potentially including effective collaboration.” A collective identity
becomes the symbolic glue that keeps participants focused on why
they are there and what they have in common, particularly in times
of conﬂict and dissensus [25,51,52]. In boundary organizations,
like RTOs, constructing a collective identity is fundamental due to
the absence of traditional organizational characteristics like hierarchical relationships. Collective identity provides a rationale for
cooperation and collaboration in the place of traditional organizational controls.
Hardy et al.’s model [25] describes two stages important in
examining the role of collective identity in interorganizational
collaboration. The ﬁrst stage focuses on how different types of conversations produce collective identity. The second stage examines
how collective identity is translated through further conversations
into innovative and synergistic action. Given our focus on the emer-

gence of a new interorganizational collaboration and its role as a
boundary organization, we adapt this model (Fig. 3).
There are two types of conversations that are fundamentally important to the creation of a collective identity [25]. First,
researchers need to pay attention to conversations that produce
generalized membership ties that connect participants to a common problem or issue around which the collaboration is organized.
Examples of conversations that contribute to formation of generalized membership ties might include characterizations or causes
of problems, rationales for action, or possible solutions. These
conversations are important because they establish a common
understanding of issues as important to stakeholders, warrant an
investment in collective action, and contribute to the discursive formation of collective identity [25]. Second, researchers need to pay
attention to conversations that produce particularized membership
ties within the interorganizational collaboration. These conversations connect stakeholders to one another rather than to an issue
and might involve discussions of status, afﬁliations, or tasks associated with a particular role. The production of particularized ties
also involves clarifying patterns of interaction such as who attends
what meetings and why, how they attend (face-to-face or at a distance), and who has been granted the authority to speak for the
collective [25,56]. For example, many RTOs have deﬁned concepts
of sector membership and employ various conﬁgurations of sector representation, functional committees, and member voting. In
these organizations, sector membership largely deﬁnes particularized membership ties. In contrast, CAISO lacks the concept of sector
membership and instead draws on the expertise and diversity of
stakeholder opinion.
Collective action is made possible through this communicative
construction of a collective identity [26,51]. However, collective
identity does not mean effective collaboration is occurring. Rather,
in the second stage of the model, collective identity is translated
into effective collaboration through other dimensions of conversations.
Having combined these literatures, we ﬁrst focus our attention
on the context in the West that has shaped the long-standing political and cultural resistance to regionalization. We are then able to
examine the shift in discourse that led to creation of the EIM. Finally,
using Hardy et al.’s [25] analytical framework this study empirically
applies three propositions regarding the formation of collective
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Constructions

Membership Ties
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Cooperative

Assertive

Generalized

Collective
Identity
Particularized

Styles of Talk
Fig. 3. Model of Interorganizational Collaboration adapted from Ref. [25].

identity to understand the emergence of a new EIM governance
structure in the Western United States:
Proposition 1. Effective interorganizational collaboration will be
more likely to ensue when the participants in a collaboration discursively produce a collective identity for themselves.
Proposition 2. Participants in an interorganizational collaboration
will be more likely to discursively construct a collective identity when
they engage in conversations that establish generalized membership
ties among themselves.
Proposition 3. Participants in an interorganizational collaboration
will be more likely to discursively construct a collective identity when
they engage in conversations that establish particularized membership
ties among them.
Accordingly, this study was guided by the following research
questions:
Research Question 1: How did stakeholders conceptualize the
boundary between CAISO and the rest of the Western Interconnection?
Research Question 2: What communicative practices or discursive
strategies did stakeholders use to connect participants to a common
issue?
Research Question 3: What communicative practices or discursive
strategies did stakeholders use to construct relationships among themselves?
Research Question 4: Which discursive texts (objects) refer to the
interorganizational collaboration and provide a rationale for cooperation (or collective action)?
4. Methods
This research uses a case study approach and qualitative methods to provide insight into how implementation of the EIM
governance structure is occurring in practice. The purpose of the
research is to conceptualize this unique change in energy system
governance and to provide empirical support of how collective

identity is formed in interorganizational collaborations. We achieve
this by applying the analytical framework provided in Hardy et al.
The qualitative methods selected for this research rely on multiple
sources of information and thick description, immersion in the context, and the self-reﬂexivity of the researcher [57,58]. By observing
what people actually do and the discursive practices they engage,
these methods allow us to go beyond description to focus on interpretation of how and why processes unfolded as they did and the
ways in which communication constructs or constitutes collective identities [57,58]. The approach responds to calls for energy
research to focus on the human-dimensions of the system, address
questions that are relevant to real world problems, and recognize
the complex contexts, histories, and multiple perspectives within
which the electricity system is embedded [32,37].
The case in this study is deﬁned by the collective action that
occurred around the formation of a new regional governance structure for the EIM and is bounded by the initial meetings of the
Public Utilities Commission-Energy Imbalance Market Group in
early 2012 through the seating of the EIM Transitional Committee
in May 2014 and the initial experiences of the Committee in working together. The case does not examine the Committee’s work to
negotiate its recommendation for a long-term governance structure.
The data for the case study include more than 50 documents
produced for the EIM initiative, 15 h of semi-structured interviews
with 15 stakeholders and 11 in-person, WebEx, and teleconference meeting observations conducted between February 2014 and
April 2015 resulting in 304 single-spaced pages of transcripts and
139 single-spaced pages of ﬁeldnotes. The research includes examination of agendas, presentations, issue papers, straw proposals,
stakeholder comments, stakeholder comment matrices, letter to
the Board of Governors, draft and ﬁnal Transitional Committee
Charter documents, and the FERC Order conditionally accepting
EIM tariff revisions available from the CAISO website (see Supplementary material for a list of all documents). Initial interviews were
selected through purposive sampling [58] to recruit interviewees
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across the different stakeholder sectors as identiﬁed in other RTOs
and the CAISO Board nomination process. Subsequent interviews
were identiﬁed through referrals from interviewees and included
in the study to the extent they achieved our purposive sampling
objectives. As a group of EIM Transitional Committee members
was named, our sampling criterion expanded to include individuals
participating on the Transitional Committee. Our interview participants include former CAISO staff, state regulators, investor owned
utilities, publicly owned utilities, marketers and generators, alternative energy providers, industry associations, and public interest
groups. The interview participants include six members of the EIM
Transitional Committee.
In the stakeholder process communication performances and
practices occur as an iterative back and forth between meeting
participation, straw proposals, presentations, written stakeholder
comments, and written responses that act “as aids in speech acts”
[58]. The documents analyzed in this study include reports and presentations that provide an accounting of agency and stakeholder
positions, and primary stakeholder comments and interviews that
provide ﬁrst-person descriptions of their own communications.
Taken together the written stakeholder comments, policy documents, interviews, and meeting observations allowed us to gain
insight into the communicative process as it occurs and provides a
measure of triangulation because data from interviews, ﬁeld notes,
and documents could be compared [58].
Initially we began the research with the broad intention of
understanding why some interorganizational collaborations result
in innovation and some do not. Early on it became evident that
stakeholders were struggling with questions of collective identity. We grounded our subsequent investigations in the literature
related to discourse, collaboration, and identity. This literature was
used to formulate research questions and inform our document
review and interviews. The interviews, written stakeholder comments, and written CAISO responses were systematically analyzed
using grounded theory and the constant comparative technique
in which meanings and claims are grounded in the codes and
categories that emerged through cumulative coding cycles and analytical memo writing [59,60].
The primary-cycle coding included open, process, and in vivo
coding to fracture the data and identiﬁed tensions around political control, cost allocation, risk, affordability, and clean energy
policy goals. This cycle of coding also identiﬁed the importance
of independence and representation in stakeholder conversations
and texts. The primary coding cycle resulted in 162 codes. We
then focused our analysis to trace communication regarding these
issues over time with focused attention on written comments
and responses around issues of independence and representation.
Subsequent cycles of coding were conducted to compare and reorganize the primary codes according to similarities or patterns to
create categories that facilitated the analysis of the connections
among codes and the development of themes, concepts, and claims.
These cycles of coding drew on theoretical constructs from the literature and were guided by the research questions for the study.
In these cycles of coding we sought to identify the discursive practices and strategies stakeholders used to connect participants to
a common issue and directly to each other, as well as, discursive
strategies used to disrupt such connections. We also sought to identify self-reﬂexive descriptions of the rationale for collective action,
which we understood as evidence of collective identity for participants. Using the coding and analytical memo writing process, we
identiﬁed four themes for the analysis: (1) boundaries and inaction, (2) shifts in the context, (3) strategic construction of the scope
and venue, and (4) an emerging collective identity. Within these
themes, we developed seven categories and 25 codes that form the
foundation for the claims presented in the following sections.

5. Energy imbalance market and unique challenges in the
west
The case is presented in the following sections: (1) boundaries and inaction in the Western interconnection; (2) discursive
strategies that shifted the context for discourse and opened the
possibility for change; (3) strategic construction of the problem to
narrow the scope of stakeholder communication and distance the
conversations from CAISO processes; and (4) the formation of a new
collective identity around the EIM. Quotes from stakeholder interviews are shown as [CAISO-XX] and quotes from written materials
in the stakeholder process as an in-text citation (see Supplementary
material for documents reﬂecting timeline of events).
5.1. Boundaries and inaction in the western interconnection
The conﬂict over organized markets and regional governance
in the West has existed since before FERC ﬁrst authorized RTOs in
1996. Stakeholders in the Western Interconnection have engaged
in multiple failed efforts to form another Western RTO, including
Desert STAR in the southwest and IndeGo, RTO West, and Grid West
in the northwest. A recent study identiﬁed three barriers to creating
either a new Western RTO or an EIM: transmission cost allocation, governance, and differences in culture [61]. In our analysis, we
focused speciﬁcally on the boundaries between CAISO and the rest
of the Western Interconnection and identiﬁed four tensions have
that lead to resistance and inaction in expanding CAISO organized
market mechanisms in the Western Interconnection.
First, transmission cost allocation and use of existing transmission rights are critical issues that shaped the original footprint of
CAISO and continue to drive decisions about whether or not to join.
Several stakeholders noted that with the growth of wind and solar
resources, the cost of new transmission capacity has become an
increasing source of tension. One stakeholder explained the tension
around building east-west transmission in the Western Interconnection this way: “. . .what’s in it for us to ﬁnance and rate the
building of all this transmission to get this thing over to Portland and California. They have this big sucking sound for all of this
renewable energy; let them pay for transmission” [CAISO-206].
Second, concerns about the economic risks of engaging with
CAISO organized markets and lingering tensions from the 2001
energy crisis continue to have salience in the region. Stakeholders explained that “the energy crisis litigation is still going on”
[CAISO-202], “they just don’t trust California” [CAISO-209], and a
perspective of “Why would I want to be subjected to a market price
that could be off the charts. . Is there really any beneﬁt? I thought
California proved that there was no beneﬁt.” [CAISO-204].
Third, there is a long-standing political and cultural resistance to
California and FERC which is expressed through a desire for “local
control”, “home grown” solutions, and “anything but California.”
Some of this concern reﬂects fear of California dominating any
regional efforts: “When California sneezes, the rest of the West gets
a cold. That’s reality” [CAISO-212] and resistance to federal regulation: “The biggest boogeyman in the room is FERC. They don’t want
to be FERC jurisdictional. .” [CAISO-213]. However, this also reﬂects
deeply held beliefs, described by one stakeholder as, “. . .something
almost embedded in me, and I don’t know where it came from, that
it was a bad thing. .” [CAISO-214].
Finally, there is a fundamental tension between the electricity
system values of CAISO and those of other entities in the Western Interconnection. CAISO is perceived as tightly aligned with
California policy making processes and achieving aggressive California policy goals, which is in tension with other stakeholders
who express a primary focus on ratepayer affordability. The authorization of CAISO in state statute “binds the ISO to the state in ways
that just doesn’t happen elsewhere” [CAISO-215], inﬂuences how
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it works with other state agencies, and inﬂuences perceptions of its
ability to be independent. As one stakeholder explained:
“California, you know, if you’ve spent any time in California,
it’s like a kind of ‘Alice in Wonderland’ of utility regulations.
Everywhere else in the West, you hear about ‘least cost, least
risk’ and cost is 95 percent of the driver of energy policy on the
part of state commissions in the Western United States, outside
of California. Now in California, a big emphasis unambiguously
is getting as much carbon free generation as possible in their
portfolio.” [CAISO-207]

5.2. Opening the possibility for change
Early work to explore a Western EIM, rather than a full RTO,
marked a shift in the broader context of stakeholder interactions
and an opening to the possibility for change. The Western Interconnection is facing policy, economic, and market opportunity drivers
of change, which are reﬂected in how the EIM as a market mechanism is framed in stakeholder interactions. In our analysis we
identiﬁed three discursive strategies that became important for
change: (1) the EIM has important differences from and is not an
RTO; (2) the EIM can facilitate clean energy goals; and (3) jurisdictional fragmentation is inherently inefﬁcient and out of step with
a modern electricity system.
First, key research institutions and regional governance entities initiated efforts to explore potential alternatives for integrating
renewable resources and improving market efﬁciency [17–24].
Through this work, an EIM emerged as an alternative to expanding or creating a new RTO in the Western Interconnection, and it is
often characterized as not an RTO. For example,
“An EIM must be justiﬁed based on its own merits without any
expectation of adding other elements typical of RTOs, such as
day-ahead markets, capacity markets, transmission planning,
or transmission expansion cost allocation. There is nothing in
the EIM market design that forces the West to later adopt an
RTO structure” [62].
In 2011, the Western Interstate Energy Board2 funded the Public
Utilities Commission (PUC)-EIM Group2 representing public utility
commissions from eleven Western states.7 This group was instrumental in moving the EIM beyond conceptual conversations. In
early 2012, the PUC-EIM Group solicited proposals for a Western
EIM. CAISO and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) both responded
with proposals demonstrating the technical feasibility and aggregate system-wide beneﬁts of an EIM. The EIM differs from an RTO in
ways that limit the political and economic risks of regionalization,
allow balancing authorities to preserve autonomy, and maintain
the fundamental aspects of CAISO governance.
Second, the ability for the EIM to integrate variable renewable resources has become an important motivation for change.
The EIM is described as a mechanism that “allows them [California] to accomplish. . a greater penetration of renewable energy”
[CAISO-207] or “an efﬁcient way to transfer that energy [overgeneration from renewable resources in California] to other states
[CAISO-211]. Recently, CAISO revised its strategic plan from a focus
on providing cost-effective services, reliability, and transparent
energy markets [63] to actively working to ‘lead the transition to
renewable energy,’ “reliably manage the grid during industry transformation,” and “expand collaboration to unlock regional beneﬁts”
[64]. In contrast to previous efforts to expand organized markets in

7
The PUC-EIM group also includes a staff member from the South Dakota Public
Utility Commission.
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the Western Interconnection, the EIM is now aligned with the core
strategies of CAISO.
Third, the legitimacy of arguments against regional integration
is being challenged by a discourse around the lack of modernization in the Western Interconnection and the inherent inefﬁciency
of jurisdictional fragmentation. The Western Interconnection is
described as “balkanized” or as a “feudal kingdom” and increasingly
out of step with the “modernization” of the grid. As one stakeholder
described it, “We’re not going to be going back to the base load system, and nobody’s going to head back to the idea that more bilateral
contracts are better than the market” [CAISO-215]. The inefﬁciency
of this fragmented system is being framed as a relevant concern
for the jurisdictions that are responsible for protecting ratepayers
and ensuring electricity affordability. For example: “I don’t want
to overstate it, but it is kind of a paradigm change for state commissioners. Usually we’re asking whether something a utility did
was ‘prudent’ or “imprudent.” I think we have to ask ourselves the
question “Is the status quo efﬁcient?” [CAISO-207].
5.3. Narrowing the scope and distancing from CAISO
Following these conceptual conversations and the initial shift in
focus from an RTO to an EIM, stakeholders took a series of actions to
initiate implementation of EIM market mechanisms. These actions
narrowed the scope of issues under discussion and distanced the
stakeholder engagement process from CAISO.
In early 2013, CAISO and PaciﬁCorp entered into a binding
implementation agreement and conducted a joint analysis estimating annual cost avoided of $10.5 million to PaciﬁCorp customers
and $10.9 million to CAISO customers [65]. Three aspects of the
implementation agreement were important: it provided binding
commitments, was based on a relatively equal sharing of beneﬁts,
and did not address the question of EIM governance. Thus, work
on the technical mechanisms proceeded, stakeholders could see an
example of balancing authority-level costs and the sharing of beneﬁts, and the politically contentious EIM governance question was
deferred, but also deﬁned by the question of how the EIM would be
governed in relation to CAISO.
In March 2013, CAISO management brought the implementation agreement to their Board of Governors for approval and
initiated a formal EIM stakeholder engagement process. The CAISOled process engaged stakeholders in a concrete initiative, opened
up access to specialized knowledge and skills to resolve the complex technical challenges of implementation, and, in the process,
surfaced conﬂicts related to governance. The April 2013 Straw Proposal proposed no transmission charge for EIM use of as-available
transmission. Although this position was challenged, this feature
remained in the EIM design and served to defer the contentious
issue of transmission cost allocation and transmission rights. The
Straw Proposal also presented three models for EIM governance:
(1) a market administrator model that places oversight of the EIM
under the CAISO Board, (2) a market operator model that places
oversight under an independent body, and (3) a hybrid approach.
In reaction to this proposal, stakeholders requested “a more indepth discussion” regarding governance issues [66] and CAISO
established a parallel stakeholder process speciﬁcally dedicated to
governance [67].
In August 2013, CAISO initiated the EIM governance stakeholder
process with a white paper that proposed establishing a Transitional Committee authorized as an advisory committee to the
CAISO Board and charged with developing recommendations for
a long-term independent governance structure. The two-step process recognized a need to foster a space for collaboration, while
allowing EIM implementation with PaciﬁCorp to proceed without
delay. Between August and December of 2013, CASIO facilitated
a process to develop a charter for the Transitional Committee
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that focused on two issues: independence and representation. The
decision to proceed with EIM implementation and to create a
Transitional Committee, narrowed the issues that needed to be
addressed, allowed new stakeholders to play a more meaningful
role in the process, and established a separation from CAISO.

stakeholders articulated multiple meanings of independence and
by deferring the issue of what authority, if any, would be delegated
to the new EIM governing body abstracted the idea of independence.

“The EIM crosses California borders and extends now soon to
be into seven different states in the West, we have to ﬁnd a
way to accommodate the interests of other regional entities. We
turned the issue over to this Transitional Committee to manage
the stakeholder process. . I think that’s a case where the ISO
[CAISO] wasn’t fully vested in the outcome other than the fact
that it needed to be resolved” [CAISO-211].

5.4.2. Abstraction of representation
CAISO’s proposal to seat Transitional Committee members was
modeled on the procedures used for the CAISO Board. Stakeholders
would be allowed to self-identify in one of the following sectors: investor owned utilities, publicly owned utilities, generators
and marketers, alternative energy providers, EIM participants, and
government agencies and public interest entities.8 However, the
central feature of the nomination and appointment process is that
it is not designed to seat individuals that represent speciﬁc sectors.
This is reﬂected in four aspects of the process. First, the Board is
required to appoint a member nominated by the ﬁrst three EIM
entities to sign implementation agreements. Second, the Board is
required to appoint members based on qualiﬁcations and rankings, but is not required to appoint a member from each sector.
Qualiﬁcations include “support for the success of EIM,” and “ability
and willingness to consider and represent a broad range of perspectives” [71]. Afﬁliation with an EIM stakeholder is not required.
Third, nominations are made through stakeholder sectors, but then
consolidated and ranked across all sectors. Finally, the number of
members exceeds the combined number of sectors and EIM participating entities. For example, the charter adopted in December
speciﬁed that there would by nine members representing eight
membership positions (seven sectors and one EIM entity).
In response to this proposal, stakeholders expressed diverse
positions regarding representation including suggestions that membership should represent each sector or should be conditional, for
example, depending on cost-exposure and risks or alternatively
a direct interest in the EIM. Other stakeholders emphasized the
important of inclusive representation. For example, “Key to bringing multiple states and BAs [balancing authorities] into the EIM
will be the degree to which those states and entities view the
governance structure as inclusive of their interests” [69]. A critical tension occurred around privileging certain stakeholders in
terms of access to the CAISO Board or guaranteed appointments.
The appointment process requires seating up to three EIM entities
with signed implementation agreements.9 In contrast, CAISO load
serving entities are not guaranteed representation. This was characterized as “a telling blind spot to California consumer interests”
[72] given the exposure of these entities to market risks and uplifts
and their inability to exit the market in under two year.
Rather than revising the nomination and selection procedures,
CAISO repeatedly explained its intent to establish committee membership based on “. . .a diverse, well-qualiﬁed, group that can
promote the objectives of a successful EIM” [69]. The commitment
to success is seen as providing “a strong incentive to properly consider all interests rather than elevating any one entity or interest
over another” [66]. Additionally, in response to requests to privilege
certain stakeholder positions, CAISO maintained the importance of
an open and transparent process stating, “The Board, however, cannot commit to provide any particular level of deference in advance
to any particular proposal, member or subgroup of the Transitional
Committee” [69].
In the course of the stakeholder process, few changes were made
to the text outlining the nomination and appointment process and
positions of stakeholders did not evolve. This was a political and

5.4. Formation of collective identity
The Transitional Committee was established as an advisory committee to the CAISO Board through authority in the CAISO tariff,
yet committee responsibilities and the membership procedures
were negotiated through the stakeholder process. In these conversations, two issues emerged as important: the text deﬁning the
independence of the permanent EIM governance structure and the
nomination and appointment procedures for Transitional Committee members.
5.4.1. Abstraction of independence
Throughout the engagement process stakeholders expressed
diverse positions regarding the independence of a long-term governance structure. In these conversations there was a tension
between stakeholders seeking to enable change and those seeking to sustain stability. The stakeholders seeking change described
independence as autonomous of California political control, geographically representative, and welcoming of new EIM participants.
“The CAISO Board of Governors, whose members are appointed by
the governor of California, is not a workable long-term governance
board for a market whose greater value derives from a wider geographic footprint” [66]. Or, more simply put: “It can’t be a creature
of California Independent System Operator or no one would join it”
[CAISO-215].
In contrast, the stakeholders seeking to sustain stability
described independence as being autonomous from a stakeholder
decision-making entity and supported retaining the status quo. For
example, “prejudgments about an independent governance structure separate from the CAISO Board of Governors are unnecessary”
[68].
Rather than explicitly accepting or rejecting different constructs
of independence or responding to requests to explicitly deﬁne
acceptable governance options, CAISO repeatedly responded, “The
current proposal intentionally avoids prescribing the speciﬁcs of
this future structure to allow such decisions to be informed by the
work of the Transitional Committee” [69].
In the course of the stakeholder process, the texts reﬂecting the
concept of EIM governance independence evolved. In the April 2013
straw proposal, CAISO presented three models of governance and
argued that governance independent of CAISO acting as the administrator “presented fundamental risks to CAISO’s ability to operate
the EIM at a low incremental cost” [70]. The October 2013 draft
of the committee charter deﬁned independence as, “independent
of individual EIM market participants” [71]. The charter language
parallels the FERC requirement for independent RTO governance,
thereby enabling, the possibility, but not requiring, CAISO delegation of authority. While the language explicitly rules out the
possibility of an EIM governance structure with ﬁnancial ties to
market participants, it does not prescribe other speciﬁcs of how
the EIM will relate to CAISO, existing CAISO-stakeholders, potential
EIM participants, or non-participants in the region. CAISO and other

8
While the process is similar the sectors used for CAISO Board of Governor nominations are different.
9
This provision was subsequently amended to create a fourth EIM Entity seat on
the Transitional Committee.
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somewhat contentious process in which CAISO and other stakeholders articulated diverse and conﬂicting positions. By structuring
the process around qualiﬁcations, diversity, a commitment to EIM
success, and open access for any interested stakeholder, CAISO
abstracted the idea of representation. Although the CAISO Board has
discretion over Transitional Committee member appointments, it is
critical that the appointments are perceived as legitimate to policy
makers within and outside of California, existing market participants, potential future market participations, and non-participants.
5.4.3. Collective identity: the EIM
The Board approved the Transitional Committee Charter in
December 2013, and members of seven nominating sectors
selected and ranked 25 nominations for Board consideration. In
May 2014, the Board amended the Transitional Committee Charter
to include an additional member and appointed eleven members to
the committee. Subsequently, three additional EIM entity members
were appointed.10
The appointment of the Transitional Committee marked another
transition. Stakeholders described the need to balance interests
to achieve success. The Transitional Committee is responsible for,
“recommending a governance structure that will be welcoming to
other utilities in the western United States and still be reassuring
enough to the California legislature and California governance that
the state’s interest, as the very biggest load in the entire system, will
be protected and its consumers will be protected.” [CAISO-215].
Furthermore, stakeholders described the Transitional Committee as “holding the pen” in developing recommendations, as
important in shaping the decision on EIM governance, and are optimistic about the potential for success. “This is creative stuff. This is
game changing stuff.” [CAISO-215].
6. Discussion and conclusions
The political context for the CAISO expansion highlights old and
new tensions. CAISO walks a ﬁne line as it interacts with and balances power and inﬂuence among new stakeholders as it seeks
regionalization, yet must maintain the involvement and conﬁdence
of California utilities, transmission owners and policy makers. Similarly, state regulators and energy system stakeholders outside of
California are seeking to promote efﬁciency, protect ratepayers and
expand the market for their resources while limiting perceived
risks. These risks include burdens from transmission cost allocation,
loss of rate stability, loss of local political and operational control,
and exposure to fundamentally different energy system values and
policy drivers. The boundaries deﬁned by these risks contributed to
the long-standing inaction around organized markets in the Western Interconnection.
A shift in the context occurred as stakeholders began discussing
an EIM as an alternative to creating a western RTO. Three discursive
strategies became important in creating legitimacy for the initial
action to move forward with the CAISO-PaciﬁCorp agreement: the
EIM is not an RTO, the EIM is fundamental for achieving clean
energy goals, and the jurisdictional fragmentation of the Western
Interconnection is inherently inefﬁcient and is placing a burden on
ratepayers. While not all stakeholders agree with these characterizations of the EIM, these discourses became prevalent and opened
the possibility for change. Additionally, stakeholders that became
directly involved in the CAISO EIM initiative used these discourses
as resources for action and further conversations.

10
The Transitional Committee Charter was revised in April 2015 to add one
member from each EIM entity, thus providing a seat for Arizona Public Service.
Subsequently, a seat was provided for Puget Sound Energy.
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As the EIM initiative unfolded, stakeholders took three important actions that narrowed the scope of issues under discussion and
distanced the stakeholder engagement process from CAISO. First,
the politically contentious question of governance was deferred
while technical implementation proceeded providing a balancing
authority-level example of the potential distribution of costs and
beneﬁts of EIM participation. Second, the venue for discussions
was distanced from conventional CAISO stakeholder engagement
process by establishing the EIM Transitional Committee as a new
structure for collaboration and engaging in outreach and meetings
throughout the region. Third, the contentious question of transmission cost allocation was deferred in the initial operation of the
EIM.
To explore how discursive practices and strategies shaped collaboration in the newly emerging EIM Transitional Committee, the
analysis empirically applies three propositions from Hardy et al.
[25] describing the role of conversations and collective identity in
collaboration.
First, Hardy et al. [25] argue that conversations that connect
participants to a common issue around which the collaboration is
organized produce generalized membership ties. The analysis of
the EIM Transitional Committee demonstrates that the discursive
strategy of abstraction allowed participating stakeholders to retain
their diverse perspectives and at the same time to connect to the
deﬁned purpose for the EIM Transitional Committee as a common
issue that warrants collective action.
Second, Hardy et al. [25] argue that conversations that develop
participants’ understanding of themselves as tied to each other
directly produce particularized membership ties. The analysis of
the EIM Transitional Committee demonstrates that the discursive
strategy of abstraction was used to establish the legitimacy of
non-CAISO interests by guaranteeing a seat for EIM entities and
an inclusive requirement accepting all nominees with a speciﬁc
interest in the EIM. Through this political process CAISO worked to
construct a distinct entity that is more that simply a set of representatives.
Hardy et al. [25] argue that the discursive construction of collective identity allows participants to construct themselves, the
problem, and the solutions as part of a collaborative framework
in which the potential for joint action is both signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial. We interpret the new orientation around The EIM and claims
by stakeholders about the potential for signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial
collaboration as evidence of an emerging collective identity formed
through a connection to the common purpose of developing recommendations for a long-term governance structure independent
of individual EIM market participants and acceptance of the Transitional Committee structure as a meaningful process.
This study demonstrates how discursive strategies, and the
strategy of abstraction in particular, can maintain a space for both
agreement and dissent, encourage participation of multiple voices,
normalize dissensus, and can constitute the collective identity of
an emerging boundary organization.
This study also contributes to the growing literature on the transition of electricity system governance and the importance of policy
in addition to technology, economics, and ﬁnance. CAISO’s position
in the Western Interconnection is instructive to other countries that
are considering similar integration, market, and transmission planning issues. These regional governance issues are already evident
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [9], within Europe
[73,74], and connections between Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa [10] and have far reaching consequences for the future
of electricity systems. The EIM is bridging long-standing resistance
to regionalization of the Western Interconnection, which is critical for integrating renewable resources. The implementation of the
EIM, through market design and governance structures, will shape
the pace of this transition and determine how beneﬁts and costs are
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shared. Additionally, the EIM is shifting jurisdictional boundaries.
Five other entities have since signed agreements to participate
and PaciﬁCorp is now considering becoming a full member of the
CAISO. The new EIM governance structure will alter the relationships among state and federal regulators and the EIM has opened
discussions about altering the governance structure of CAISO.
This research is enabled and limited by the focus on a newly
forming interorganizational collaboration and a single case. A case
approach allows us to conceptualize a context that is intrinsically
interesting, trace discursive practices over time, provide empirical
application of theories, and extend existing theories to a new context [75–77]. However, the work of the EIM Transitional Committee
is ongoing and further research is needed to assess how the collective identity of the Transitional Committee evolves, whether it is
able to accomplish effective collaboration, and whether it is able
to contribute to policy innovation and effective implementation of
policies to integrate renewables into the electricity system. We suggest further research examining how the EIM collective identity is
translated through conversations and how this interorganizational
collaboration shapes policy implementation.
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